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Bioethics and Epistemology:
A Response to Professor Arrast
SUSAN H. WILLIAMS*
Professor Arras' article' provides a fascinating and persuasive account of
an important shift in bioethics. The move from theory-based systems of ethics
to narrative-based systems of ethics is paralleled by shifts in several related
fields. In legal theory, one can see this development in the rise of legal
pragmatism and the questioning of abstract and comprehensive theories,
whether those theories are rights-based and liberal, radical and Marxist, or
economics-based and conservative. This shift is also evident in feminist
theory, where there is a growing emphasis on context and a resistance to
living within the restrictions of any one brand of feminism, whether it be
liberal feminism, radical feminism, or cultural feminism. An important part
of this development in feminist theory involves a fundamental change in
epistemology. I would like to explore the epistemological implications of the
shift from an ethics based on theory to one based on narrative because I
believe that at the level of epistemology we can see a tension between the
new ethical systems and the underlying assumptions of conventional science.
The theory-based ethics that dominated bioethics in the first and second
stages of Professor Arras' story were closely tied to a mainstream tradition
in epistemology, which I will call Cartesianism. Cartesian epistemology
presents a picture of the world in which an external and objective reality is
available to individual knowers through the use of their reason, often
combined with their sense perception. The knowledge attained is universally
true, rather than merely true for a particular person in a particular place and
time.2
Breaking this picture down into component pieces, one finds that it involves
several important assumptions.' First, reality is objective in the sense that it
is independent of human understandings of it. In other words, reality is simply
"out there," and its character is unaffected by whether anyone recognizes or
understands it.
Second, this objective reality is, at least in principle, accessible to human
knowledge. This assumption gives rise to the traditionally dominant theory of
truth in Western epistemology: the correspondence theory. The correspondence
t © Copyright 1994 by Susan H. Williams. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington.
1. John D. Arras, Principles and Particularity: The Role of Cases in Bioethics, 69 IND. L.J. 983
(1994).
2. See Alison M. Jaggar & Susan R. Bordo, Introduction to GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE 1, 3
(Alison M. Jaggar & Susan R. Bordo eds., 1989); Jane Flax, Postmodernism and Gender Relations in
Feminist Theory, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 39, 41-42 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).
3. The discussion of Cartesianism here is a short summary of my more detailed treatment of the
subject in Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 63, 64-68
(1993).
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theory holds that a proposition is true if and only if it accurately describes the
nature of this objective reality.'
Third, Cartesianism assumes that people approach the task of gaining
knowledge individually rather than as socially-constituted members of
particular groups. This form of epistemological individualism means that the
tools or capacities necessary for the pursuit of knowledge exist in individual
human beings considered independently of their particular social context.
Fourth, Cartesianism includes a rationalist bias; it assumes that the primary
faculty through which human beings gain knowledge is their reason. One of
the central arguments within Cartesianism has been over the degree to which
reason must be supplemented by sense perception. That argument has
generated the division between rationalists and empiricists.5 Both camps are
Cartesian within my definition because, even for empiricists, reason is the
primary faculty for assessing sense data and acquiring knowledge from it.
Finally, the knowledge attained through the proper exercise of these
faculties is true for all people; it is universal. There cannot be competing
truths; on any given issue there is only one truth. All other perspectives are
more or less false, due to a greater or lesser degree of failure to properly
exercise the capacities for reasoning or gathering sense data.
The various theory-based systems of ethics described by Professor Arras
depend, in various ways, on this Cartesian epistemology. Kant, for example,
sought to define a conception of moral truth with a high level of objectivity,
completely independent of the perceptions (or misperceptions) of the
conventional ethics that dominated his day.6 He founded this objective ethics
on a strong distinction between reason and other capacities7 and held that this
ethical system was necessary, rather than contingent and dependent on a
particular social context.8 Kant's universalism, in fact, goes far beyond that
of any contemporary theorist in that he believed his ethical discoveries held
true not only for all human beings, but for all rational creatures.9
Many forms of utilitarianism also depend on Cartesian epistemology. The
utilitarian calculus requires that one be able to ascertain in an objective way
4. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 127-30 (1912); Kenneth J. Gergen,
Feminist Critique of Science and the Challenge of Social Epistemology, in FEMINIST THOUGHT AND THE
STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE 27, 28 (Mary McCanney Gergen ed., 1988). See generally RICHARD
RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979) (describing the development of this
representational model and criticizing it).
5. Empiricists hold that all knowledge is derived from experience. See RUSSELL, supra note 4, at
73-74. Empiricists use statements about appearances or sense perceptions as the basic tools out of which
reason can build knowledge. See generally JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDER-
STANDING (Peter H. Nidditch ed., 1975); CLARENCE I. LEWIS, AN ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND
VALUATION (1946). On the other hand, rationalists like Descartes place more reliance on reason acting
independently of sense perception. See Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting
the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences, in THE RATIONALISTS 39, 62-63 (Anchor Books ed.,
1974).
6. See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 26 (Lewis White Beck
trans., 1959).
7. Id. at 11-12.
8. Id. at 5.
9. Id. at 24.
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the amount of pleasure or pain caused a person by a particular course of
action. Bentham thought he had discerned regular patterns of utility produc-
tion; for example, taking away a portion of property from someone would
cause a degree of pain equal to the proportion between the total property of
that person and the amount taken.' Bentham clearly believed such patterns
to be objectively true: that is, corresponding to a reality independent of
whether people recognized it and available to human knowledge through a
combination of reason and observation." This knowledge was offered as true
for all human beings rather than as a description of the social psychology of
eighteenth century England. Indeed, Professor Arras' descriptions of these
theory-based systems rely heavily on the watchwords of Cartesianism-even
the most moderate of such theoretical systems he calls objective and
universal."
In light of some of the discussion earlier in this symposium, I should
perhaps add a word on principles versus theory. Tom Beauchamp argued that
no one still defends theory in the Kantian sense I have just described. 3 He
asserted that his principles, for example, are neither absolute nor comprehen-
sive nor deductive.' 4 These characteristics-absoluteness, deductiveness, and
comprehensiveness-point to the function of the principles in a normative
analysis; they relate to how the principles are used. My focus is, instead, on
the epistemological status of the principles-whether they are viewed as a
certain kind of knowledge: objective, rational, and universal. The two aspects
are, of course, related; what a principle is will affect what it does and how it
functions. But they are nonetheless not identical. It would be possible to
believe that one's principles are objective, rational, and universally true and
still not use them in a deductive way or think that they are completely
comprehensive or absolute.
It may be that neither Professor Beauchamp's system nor other systems
within the principles approach would qualify as theory, even in this epistemic
sense-although I believe this is much less clear. If that is the case, then two
points follow. First, the proponents of such approaches must be willing to
give up the claims of greater determinateness made by such theories, as Karen
Hanson pointed out. 5 Second, if the principles approach is not Cartesian,
then the epistemological challenge I am about to describe would have existed
for some time already. It would, however, still be the case that narrative
approaches have made the challenge clear, in a way that the earlier model
never did.
10. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 6-13, 20-27 (C. K. Ogden ed., 1987).
11. Id. at 20-27.
12. Arras, supra note I, at 986.
13. See Tom L. Beauchamp, Principles and Other Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics, 69 IND. L.J.
955, 959 (1994).
14. Id. at 968-69.
15. Karen Hanson, Are Principles Ever Properly Ignored? A Reply to Beauchamp on Btoethical
Paradigms, 69 IND. L.L 975, 979-80 (1994).
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So, on to the narrative challenge. The narrative-based ethics described in the
last section of Professor Arras' paper do not share this connection to
Cartesian epistemology. Many narrative-based ethics rest on very different
epistemological assumptions-assumptions that challenge the foundations of
Cartesianism. At the heart of this challenge is a claim about the interpretive
and contextual nature of human knowledge.
This alternative epistemology argues that the creation of knowledge is an
activity that takes place only within, and is deeply shaped by a particular
social context. Context permeates knowledge creation because of the
inevitably interpretative nature of the process. First, the very facts that are
taken by Cartesianism to be the materials out of which reason constructs
knowledge are a product of cultural interpretation.' 6 Facts are made by a
process of selection from experience. What one notices and how one organizes
that experience are both constrained by the conceptual categories available
within one's culture.' 7 Interpretation enters again when one tries to analyze
the data. Data underdetermine the theories that they are used to construct. To
choose between the alternative interpretations that are always available,
individuals must rely-implicitly or explicitly-on a value judgment. To the
extent that values are in fact culturally shaped, knowledge will be permeated
by those cultural forces.
This alternative epistemology, in other words, denies each assumption of
Cartesianism. First, no knowledge of a truly objective reality is accessible to
human beings because they always approach it through the screen of context
and culture. Second, instrumental reason is an insufficient tool for acquiring
knowledge because some more substantive values must be used to choose
between interpretations. Third, individuals come to knowledge creation as
members of a given cultural context and they use the resources of that context
in the process. And, finally, knowledge, therefore, may be personal or social
rather than universal-there can be many truths rather than just one.
Narrative systems of ethics fit very nicely with this alternative epistemolo-
gy.-'8 After all, if context and interpretation permeate knowledge, a narrative
method would be very effective as a means of acquiring such knowledge.
Narrative operates from within the interpretive perspective rather than
attempting to transcend it. It offers the listener or reader the chance to enter
into a new context in a way that uses a broad range of faculties, emotional
and moral as well as rational.9 It is, in a sense, a way of trying on a context
16. Arras, supra note 1, at 1013.
17. See Ruth Hubbard, Some Thoughts About the Masculinity of the Natural Sciences, in FEMINIST
THOUGHT AND THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE supra note 4, at 1; Naomi Scheman, Individualism and
the Objects of Psychology, in DISCOVERING REALITY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON EPISTEMOLOGY,
METAPHYSICS, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 225, 229 (Sandra Harding & Merilla B.
Hintikka eds., 1983).
18. For a discussion of different types of narratives and their epistemological implications, see
generally Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991).
19. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAuM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE 3-53, 148-67 (1990); Lynne N. Henderson,
Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987).
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to see what knowledge is available within it that was inaccessible previous-
ly.2
0
The particular characteristics of the narratives now used in bioethics, as
described by Professor Arras,21 are explained by this epistemological
function. In order to create the context so crucial to knowledge, the stories
must be richly detailed and evocative.22 They must reckon with the element
of character 2 -3 which stands for the interpenetration of person and context,
the denial of an acontextual personhood. And, they must be true to the
contexts in which actual people live, or they will be of little value in
acquiring knowledge relevant to those contexts. Thus, the narrative systems
of ethics beginning to shape the field of bioethics should be seen as the
vanguard of a broad epistemological movement.
This epistemological movement holds special importance in the case of
ethics applied to science. As perhaps is evident, the Cartesian epistemology
at the foundation of theory-based ethics is also at the foundation of conven-
tional science. Indeed, in many ways, science is the ideal that Cartesianism
holds up to other disciplines, like ethics.24 Science is the purest pursuit of
objective and universal truth through methods designed to rely on observation
and reason to the exclusion of emotion and cultural context.
I do not mean to suggest that there are no non-Cartesian models of science.
Certain non-traditional branches of science may themselves rest on or imply
an anti-Cartesian epistemology-perhaps chaos theory is an example.25
Philosophers of science have been responding to both the upheaval in science
itself and the wave of anti-Cartesian epistemologies by exploring new models
of science. I would suggest, however, that Cartesianism still permeates the
understanding of most practitioners of science and medicine, as it does the
understanding of most members of modern, Western cultures generally. Thus,
the practice to which bioethics responds is still largely shaped by Cartesian
assumptions.
The trend 'described by Professor Arras,26 therefore, poses an interesting
problem. The narrative approach to ethics may rest on an epistemology that
undermines the understanding of practitioners about the knowledge claims of
their own disciplines. This epistemological tension, if brought to the surface,
might have important implications for ways in which the practice should be
changed if it is to be brought into line with the alternative epistemology. As
just one example, medical practitioners would have to take far more seriously
the knowledge claims of patients, even when they could not verify those
claims through "objective" methods, because the patient's perspective may
20. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 880-81 (1990);
Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 16 (1987).
21. Arras, supra note 1, at 1004-06.
22. Id. at 1004.
23. Id. at 1004-05.
24. Id. at 1012.
25. See generally STEPHEN H. KELLERT, IN THE WAKE OF CHAOS (1993) (describing and explaining
chaos theory, a new scientific inquiry that creates new distinctions among established disciplines).
26. Arras, supra note 1, at 1006-07.
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give her acess to a truth that is just as true as the reading on a thermometer,
but that is, even in theory, inaccessible to the practitioner.
As this example illustrates, a shift in epistemology may have normative or
ethical implications. The point of my comments is that the reverse is also true.
A shift in ethics may have epistemological implications. Indeed, I think that
the most important conclusion to be drawn from this brief examination is that
ethics and epistemology are fundamentally connected. In important ways, they
are reflections of each other. One cannot have ethics without making certain
epistemological assumptions because any ethics rests on claims about the
nature of reality-whether that reality is human nature, the human condition,
God's will, or the nature of reason. Similarly, one cannot have an epistemolo-
gy without making certain ethical assumptions because all conceptions of
reality involve interpretation and value judgment.
As a result, knowledge claims are subject to moral criticism, just as moral
claims are subject to epistemological challenge. The shift to a narrative ethics
may carry with it the seeds of a more far-reaching change in the nature of
bioethics if it leads practitioners to a greater recognition of the interdepen-
dence of ethics and epistemology.
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